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AMBRO, 
ABC Corp., John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 seek to 
appeal an order of the District Court requiring ABC Corp., 
Blank Rome LLP, and LaCheen, Wittels & Greenberg, LLP 
to produce certain documents to the Government as part of an 
ongoing grand jury investigation.
Circuit Judge 
1
When a district court orders the production of 
supposedly privileged documents, its order usually is not an 
immediately appealable final decision.  To obtain immediate 
appellate review, an objecting privilege holder must disobey 
the disclosure order, be held in contempt, and then appeal the 
contempt order.  Appellants argue that Perlman v. United 
States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), provides an exception to the 
contempt rule here because the documents are in the custody 
of a third party (Blank Rome) who is not willing to suffer 
contempt for the sake of an immediate appeal. 
  The sought-after 
documents are currently in the custody of Blank Rome, a law 
firm that represents John Doe 2.  Blank Rome is housing the 
documents at the request of LaCheen Wittels, a law firm 
representing ABC Corp. and John Doe 1.  Appellants claim 
the attorney-client privilege — ABC Corp. is the privilege 
holder — and the work product rule shield the documents 
from disclosure.  The District Court disagreed, concluding 
that the crime-fraud doctrine vitiates any privilege or work 
product protection. 
We disagree, and hold instead that Perlman does not 
allow an immediate appeal of a district court’s order 
mandating the production of supposedly privileged 
documents when (1) the court’s order directs the privilege 
                                              
1 To maintain the secrecy of the investigation, we refer to the 
facts in general terms. 
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holder itself to produce the documents and (2) the privilege 
holder has, or may obtain, custody of the documents.  In 
short, Perlman does not apply when the traditional contempt 
route is open to the privilege holder.2
I. Background 
  That route is open to 
ABC Corp.  The District Court ordered the company to 
produce the documents, and it may obtain custody of the 
documents from its agents.  If ABC Corp. wants pre-
conviction appellate review of the District Court’s crime-
fraud ruling, it must take possession of the documents and 
defy that Court’s disclosure order before appealing any 
resulting contempt sanctions.  Because it has not yet met 
these preconditions, we dismiss for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction. 
 ABC Corp. is an administratively “dissolved” 
corporation.  It was formed in early 2004 and it ceased 
business operations in late 2005.  John Doe 1 was the 
company’s President and sole indirect shareholder and John 
Doe 2 is his son.  To repeat, LaCheen Wittels represents ABC 
Corp. and John Doe 1 while Blank Rome represents John Doe 
2.  The law firms have, however, a joint-defense agreement 
with respect to the three Appellants. 
In mid-2010, Appellants learned that the Government 
was investigating the tax implications of ABC Corp.’s 
acquisition and sale of certain closely held companies.  In 
December 2010, the Government issued a grand jury 
subpoena to ABC Corp.’s former vice president of corporate 
acquisitions as the company’s custodian of records.  The 
subpoena sought any and all records relating to transactions 
                                              
2As we explain below, there is a sui generis exception to our 
holding for the President of the United States.  See infra note 
4. 
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and business dealings between ABC Corp. and specific 
entities and individuals. 
At some point the Government received access to, or 
copies of, certain ABC Corp. documents from a law firm that 
previously represented the company.  The firm withheld 
certain documents it claimed were privileged, but it did not 
supply the Government with a privilege log.  After LaCheen 
Wittels and Blank Rome assumed their current 
representations, the former firm of ABC Corp. transferred the 
documents to Blank Rome.  According to Appellants, 
LaCheen Wittels did not have sufficient space to store the 
documents, so Blank Rome agreed to hold them as custodian. 
In a January 2011 letter, LaCheen Wittels took the 
position that the Government did not effectively serve the 
subpoena issued to ABC Corp.’s former vice president.  
Nonetheless, in March 2011, LaCheen Wittels and Blank 
Rome provided the Government with a privilege log, which 
they revised in April 2011, for the documents ABC Corp.’s 
former firm once withheld. 
Because ABC Corp. refused to accept service of the 
subpoena issued to its former employee, the Government 
issued grand jury subpoenas to LaCheen Wittels and Blank 
Rome in May 2011.  The subpoenas sought all documents the 
two firms received from ABC Corp.’s former law firm 
relating to ABC Corp. and another entity.  In response to 
these subpoenas, the law firms produced approximately 24 
boxes of documents.  These were the same documents that 
ABC Corp.’s former firm had previously produced.  They 
continued to withhold, however, the documents listed on the 
April 2011 privilege log, and provided the Government with 
another privilege log in June 2011 for additional documents 
withheld. 
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The Government then filed an ex parte motion to 
compel ABC Corp., Blank Rome, and LaCheen Wittels to 
produce 171 of the 303 documents identified on the privilege 
logs.  It argued that the documents should be produced based 
on the crime-fraud doctrine, which provides that evidentiary 
privileges may not be used to shield “communications made 
for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a 
fraud or crime.”  United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 
(1989) (internal quotations omitted). 
On March 8, 2012, the District Court granted the 
Government’s motion and, in a two-page order, directed ABC 
Corp., Blank Rome, and LaCheen Wittels to produce 167 of 
the 171 requested documents by March 16.  The 167 
documents comprise roughly 800 pages.  In an accompanying 
42-page opinion, the District Court concluded that the crime-
fraud doctrine barred ABC Corp.’s privilege and work 
product claims.  It did not resolve whether the Government 
properly served ABC Corp. with a subpoena by serving its 
former vice president, but noted that “[t]his issue is of no 
moment here.  There is no allegation that the subpoenas were 
served improperly on Blank Rome and LaCheen Wittels[,] 
who are presently in the possession of the documents the 
government seeks.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 9. 
Five days later, Appellants filed a timely notice of 
appeal and a motion for a stay pending appeal.  We granted 
the stay and expedited the appeal.3
                                              
3 This is the second time Appellants have attempted a 
Perlman appeal in this matter.  See In re Grand Jury Matter 
#4, No. 11-4105 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2011) (summarily 
dismissing for lack of jurisdiction).  According to Appellants, 
the documents at issue in that appeal had already been turned 
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II. Discussion 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  Our jurisdiction is in dispute, but we have 
jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction.  Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 
456 F.3d 88, 94 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006). 
A. 
“[T]he right to a judgment from more than one court is 
a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice . . . 
.”  Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).  
Congress has bestowed such grace by granting the Courts of 
Appeals jurisdiction over “final decisions” of the district 
courts.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether a decision is “final” 
depends on its effects.  Marcus v. Twp. of Abington, 38 F.3d 
1367, 1370 (3d Cir. 1994).  “Ordinarily, a final decision will 
have two effects.  First, the decision will fully resolve all 
claims presented to the district court.  Second, after the 
decision has been issued, there will be nothing further for the 
district court to do.” Aluminum Co. of America v. Beazer 
East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 557 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Catlin 
v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (“A ‘final 
decision’ generally is one which ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.”). 
Finality and the Contempt Rule 
When a district court orders a witness — whether a 
party to an underlying litigation, a subject or target of a grand 
jury investigation, or a complete stranger to the proceedings 
                                                                                                     
over to and reviewed by the Government by the time the 
panel issued its order.  Here, in contrast, the documents are 
not in the Government’s possession and the Government has 
not reviewed them. 
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— to produce documents, the district court’s order generally 
is not considered an immediately appealable “final 
decision[]” under § 1291.  See United States v. Ryan, 402 
U.S. 530, 532–34 (1971); Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326–29; 
Alexander v. United States, 201 U.S. 117, 118–22 (1906).  It 
is well-settled that a witness who “seeks to present an 
objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of 
appeals must refuse compliance, be held in contempt, and 
then appeal the contempt order.”  Church of Scientology of 
Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992); see also 
Ryan, 402 U.S. at 532–34; Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326–29; 
Alexander, 201 U.S. at 118–22; DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 
114, 121–23 (3d Cir. 1982).  A district court’s contempt order 
is itself immediately appealable because it is a final judgment 
imposing penalties on the willfully disobedient witness in 
what is effectively a separate proceeding.  The Supreme 
Court has explained that 
if the witnesses refuse to comply 
with [a disclosure order] and the 
court then exercises its authority 
either to punish them or to coerce 
them into compliance, that will 
give rise to another case or cases 
to which the witnesses will be 
parties on the one hand, and the 
government, as a sovereign 
vindicating the dignity and 
authority of one of its courts, will 
be a party on the other hand. 
Alexander, 201 U.S. at 122 (quotations omitted).  “[A] 
judgment adverse to the witnesses in that proceeding or case 
will be a final decision.”  Id. 
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The contempt route to an immediately appealable final 
decision is a firmly established feature of federal appellate 
procedure, stretching back to at least the Supreme Court’s 
1906 decision in Alexander, but the decision to travel that 
route must not be made lightly.  In this regard the Supreme 
Court has 
consistently held that the 
necessity for expedition in the 
administration of the criminal law 
justifies putting one who seeks to 
resist the production of desired 
information to a choice between 
compliance with a trial court’s 
order to produce prior to any 
review of that order, and 
resistance to that order with the 
concomitant possibility of an 
adjudication of contempt if his 
claims are rejected on appeal. 
Ryan, 402 U.S. at 533.  The rule, “though at times a harsh 
one, was formulated to discourage appeals in all but the most 
serious cases.”  In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Appeal of 
FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979).  Requiring a 
person who objects to a disclosure order to “refuse to comply, 
be subjected to sanctions in contempt, and then appeal from 
the sanctions. . . . [,] puts the objecting person’s sincerity to 
the test by attaching a price to the demand for immediate 
review.”  Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 
2010).  It forces the objector to weigh carefully the likelihood 
of success of its challenge to the underlying disclosure order 
against the seriousness of the sanctions it would face — 
whether a hefty monetary fine, incarceration, or some other 
penalty — if it ignores the order to disclose.  It also forces the 
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objector to assess the importance it attaches to avoiding the 
ordered disclosure and protecting any associated privileges. 
The severity of the contempt rule is well justified 
because immediate appellate review of disclosure orders 
creates great delay in our justice system and runs especially 
against the principle of speedy trials for allegations of 
criminal conduct.  See Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 
121, 126 (1962) (“[T]he delays and disruptions attendant 
upon intermediate appeal are especially inimical to the 
effective and fair administration of the criminal law.”); 
Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325 (“These considerations of policy 
are especially compelling in the administration of criminal 
justice. . . .  [E]ncouragement of delay is fatal to the 
vindication of the criminal law.”).  Although an appeal of a 
contempt order may itself involve a disruption of the 
underlying proceedings, “not to allow this interruption would 
forever preclude review of the witness’ claim, for his 
alternatives are to abandon the claim or languish in jail.”  
Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 328. 
B. 
In Perlman, the Supreme Court carved out an 
exception to the rule that a custodian of documents must 
stand in contempt of a discovery order before an immediate 
appeal may be taken.  247 U.S. at 8–13.  In that case, Louis 
Perlman testified on behalf of his company in a patent 
infringement suit in District Court.  Id. at 8.  When the 
company moved to dismiss its suit without prejudice, the 
District Court granted the company’s motion but it ordered 
the court clerk to impound the exhibits Perlman used during 
his testimony and to maintain them under seal.  Id. at 8–9. 
The Perlman Exception to the Contempt Rule 
Soon after, the Government began a grand jury 
investigation of Perlman, suspecting him of having 
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committed perjury during his testimony.  Id. at 11–12.  To 
assist in the investigation, the Government sought an order 
from the District Court directing the court clerk to produce 
the exhibits Perlman used during his testimony.  Id. at 9–10.  
Perlman objected, claiming that use of the exhibits as a basis 
for indictment against him would be an unreasonable search 
and seizure and would make him a compulsory witness 
against himself in violation of the Constitution’s Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.  Id. at 10, 13.  The District Court rejected 
Perlman’s challenge and ordered the clerk to produce the 
exhibits to the Government.  Id. at 10–11. 
When Perlman ultimately appealed to the Supreme 
Court, which heard the case under its then-obligatory 
appellate jurisdiction, the Government argued that the District 
Court’s disclosure order was not appealable.  Id. at 12.  The 
Court disagreed, saying only that 
[t]he second contention of the 
government is somewhat strange, 
that is, that the order granted upon 
its solicitation was not final as to 
Perlman but interlocutory in a 
proceeding not yet brought and 
depending upon it to be brought. 
In other words, that Perlman was 
powerless to avert the mischief of 
the order but must accept its 
incidence and seek a remedy at 
some other time and in some other 
way. We are unable to concur. 
Id. at 12–13. 
Whatever else Perlman may require, we can discern 
the sine qua non:  when a court orders a custodian that is not 
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a privilege holder to produce purportedly privileged 
documents, the privilege holder may immediately appeal the 
disclosure order only when it is impossible for the privilege 
holder itself to disobey the order, be held in contempt, and 
appeal any contempt sanctions.  In Perlman, the District 
Court did not order Perlman to produce any documents.  Its 
order was directed only to the court clerk.  There was simply 
no court order for Perlman to disobey.  Furthermore, Perlman 
could not have obtained custody of the exhibits from the court 
clerk (and then stood in contempt of a later disclosure order 
directed at him) because a previous court order directed the 
clerk to impound the exhibits and maintain custody of them 
under seal.  Perlman thus was “powerless to avert the 
mischief of the [disclosure] order” because he could not take 
the traditional contempt route to a final decision.4
                                              
4 To be clear, it is a necessary (but not sufficient) prerequisite 
to Perlman’s application that the traditional contempt route is 
closed to the privilege holder.  See 15B Charles Alan Wright 
et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.23 (2d ed. 1992) 
(“The Perlman decision never has meant that appeal can be 
taken simply because the alternative of disobedience and 
contempt is not available.  Orders denying discovery do not 
afford any opportunity for disobedience, yet are not 
appealable on this theory.”). 
 
 
There is a unique exception to our holding that Perlman 
cannot apply when the contempt route remains open to the 
objector.  It applies when the objector is the President of the 
United States.  See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
691–92 (1974) (applying Perlman and holding that to require 
the President to travel the contempt route “would be 
unseemly, and would present an unnecessary occasion for 
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In this vein, we have explained that “the Alexander-
Cobbledick-Ryan [contempt] rule restricting appellate review 
is limited to situations where the contempt route to a final 
order is available to the appellant.”  In re Matter of Grand 
Jury Applicants (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 
1025 (3d Cir. 1980).  In contrast, appellants in Perlman and 
its progeny “were not the targets of the subpoena itself, which 
meant that the contempt route for obtaining an appeal was not 
available to them.”  In the Matter of Grand Jury Empanelled 
Aug. 14, 1979 (Appeal of TRW Credit Data, Inc.), 638 F.2d 
1235, 1237 (3d Cir. 1981). 
Consistent with this understanding of the contempt 
rule and the Perlman exception, we have permitted an appeal 
of a disclosure order adverse to the attorney-client privilege 
when the privilege holder was not subpoenaed.  See In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Appeal of FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 
798 (3d Cir. 1979).  In FMC Corp., the Government issued a 
grand jury subpoena to Douglas Kliever, FMC’s former 
outside counsel.  Id. at 799–800.  Kliever refused to produce 
certain documents, asserting the attorney-client privilege and 
work product protection.  Id.  The District Court granted the 
Government’s motion to compel and ordered Kliever to 
produce the documents, finding that the crime-fraud 
exception barred any privilege or work product protection.  
Id. 
                                                                                                     
constitutional confrontation between two branches of the 
Government”); 15B Wright, supra, § 3914.23 (“The Court’s 
language [in Nixon] suggested that it was not anxious to 
create a corrosive principle that might allow others to bypass 
the disobedience and contempt path to appeal.”).  Appellants 
do not suggest that Nixon by analogy supports jurisdiction 
here. 
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FMC appealed “as the nonsubpoenaed holder of the 
attorney-client privilege and assert[ed] a right to raise the 
work product privilege as well.”  Id. at 801 (emphasis added).  
It claimed that Kliever would not disobey the district court’s 
order nor would it ask him to do so.  Id. at 800.  We began 
our jurisdictional analysis of FMC’s appeal by noting that the 
company had “not been subpoenaed to produce the 
documents and therefore would not [have been] held in 
contempt were they not produced.”  Id.  A contempt citation 
would apply only to its former attorney, Kliever.  We then 
turned to our precedent, and noted that “[r]easoning 
pragmatically that a witness will not usually undergo the 
penalties of contempt in order to preserve someone else’s 
privilege, the courts permit appeal by an intervenor [i.e., the 
privilege holder] without the necessity of a sentence for 
contempt.”  Id. at 800-01 (quoting In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Appeals of Cianfrani & Kalman), 563 F.2d 577, 
580 (3d Cir. 1977)) (citing Perlman, 247 U.S. at 7, 15).  Thus 
we concluded that we had jurisdiction.  Id. at 801. 
 Some of our sister Courts of Appeals also have 
recognized that Perlman does not apply when the contempt 
route is open to the privilege holder.  For example, the 
Second Circuit has explained that “in Perlman . . .  ‘the 
contempt avenue for ultimately securing review’ of the 
district court’s production order ‘was not available since 
Perlman was not being required to do anything.’”  In re Air 
Crash at Belle Harbor, N.Y. on Nov. 12, 2001, 490 F.3d 99, 
105 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. 
Mercantile Exch., 591 F.2d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 1979)).  “[T]he 
Perlman exception is relevant only to appeals brought by the 
holder of a privilege where the disputed subpoena is directed 
at someone else.”  Id. at 106 (emphasis added).  “It is 
impossible for such an appellant to pursue the normal avenue 
of review — submission to contempt — because, like 
Perlman, that appellant has not been required to do anything 
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by the district court.”  Id.  Opinions from the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits reflect a similar understanding.  See Wilson, 
621 F.3d at 642–43 (“contrast[ing]” Perlman with those 
situations in which “an order of disclosure is directed against 
a person whose legal interests are affected” because “that 
person has a means to obtain appellate review” — namely, 
the contempt route) (emphasis in original); In re Motor Fuel 
Temperature Sales Practice Litig., 641 F.3d 470, 485-86 
(10th Cir. 2011) (refusing to apply Perlman when non-party 
trade associations who objected to disclosing purportedly 
privileged information could “refuse to comply with the 
subpoenas directed to themselves, incur contempt citations, 
and appeal from the contempt orders”). 
C. 
ABC Corp. is subject to a court order to produce 
documents.  Unlike Louis Perlman, the company has been 
required to do something.  Appellants nonetheless contend 
that the contempt route is not open to ABC.  While we are 
sensitive to some of Appellants’ practical concerns, we 
cannot agree that Perlman permits this appeal. 
Whether the Contempt Route Remains Open to ABC 
Corp. 
 Appellants assert that the District Court’s order 
“erroneously included” ABC Corp. and in fact “should not 
have been directed to [the company] at all.”  Appellants’ 
Reply Br. at 5.  It therefore cannot be held in contempt for 
disobeying the order.  According to Appellants, the District 
Court should not have ordered ABC Corp. to produce the 
documents because the Government never properly served the 
company with a subpoena and, in any event, ABC Corp. does 
not have custody of the documents.   
These arguments miss the mark.  An order does not 
become immediately appealable simply because a putative 
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appellant believes that it is, in one way or another, wrong or 
improper.  If ABC Corp. believes that the District Court’s 
order is reversible for whatever reason — whether because it 
was not preceded by proper service of a subpoena, because it 
is the result of an improper crime-fraud ruling, or for any 
other reason — and it wishes to present its challenge in an 
immediate appeal, it must disobey the order and take the 
contempt route.  Until and unless it is vacated, the District 
Court’s order — not the grand jury’s subpoena — binds the 
company and compels production of the documents.  See 
Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959) (“A grand 
jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it 
remains an appendage of the court, powerless to perform its 
investigative function without the court’s aid, because 
powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Harris v. United States, 382 
U.S. 162, 167 (1965). 
Appellants then claim that, even if the District Court’s 
order were valid,  ABC Corp. could not disobey that order 
because it does not have custody of the documents.  To 
repeat, Blank Rome is currently holding the requested 
documents and it holds them at the request of ABC Corp.’s 
counsel, LaCheen Wittels.  The Government’s response is 
simple:  ABC Corp. may take the documents from Blank 
Rome.  It is undisputed that Appellants and their respective 
law firms have a joint-defense agreement in place.  If the 
privilege holder-client ABC Corp. directs its counsel 
LaCheen Wittels to direct the custodian Blank Rome to 
transfer the documents to ABC Corp.’s custody, then the 
agents must oblige the principal.  See In re Grand Jury, 821 
F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that, in the context of 
responding to a subpoena, “possession” means “legal 
control”).  We agree with the Government. 
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Appellants contend the Government’s position ignores 
the seriousness of a grand jury subpoena and court order.  
Appellants’ Reply Br. at 8.  After all, the law firms are 
subject to the same court order as the company.  According to 
Appellants,  
[h]ad Blank Rome, after receipt of 
a grand jury subpoena, done 
anything other than preserve the 
documents, the government would 
surely charge that [ABC Corp.] 
and, for that matter, the law firms, 
were guilty of obstruction of 
justice by engaging in behavior 
intended to thwart the grand 
jury’s investigation.  See 18 
U.S.C. §1503 (obstruction of 
grand jury investigation).  No law 
firm, under these circumstances, 
would transfer documents subject 
to subpoena to the privilege 
holder and the government’s 
suggestion that this should be the 
“routine practice” finds no 
support in case law. 
Id. at 8–9. 
These concerns are understandable.  Indeed we too 
have not found any case in which a court has approved a 
transfer of documents between multiple parties subject to a 
disclosure order so that the privilege holder could take the 
contempt route to immediate appellate review while leaving 
the other parties free of contempt fears.  But here we put 
those fears to bed.  It would not be obstruction of justice, as 
the Government conceded at oral argument, if Blank Rome 
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transfers the documents to ABC Corp. — after giving the 
Government and the District Court sufficient notice of the 
time, place, and other circumstances of the transfer — so that 
the company can go down the well-established path of 
disobeying a disclosure order, suffering contempt, and then 
appealing any contempt sanctions. 
Of course, this is not a license for Blank Rome to send 
the documents out of the jurisdiction or to act in bad faith in 
any way when transferring the documents to ABC Corp.  We 
have no reason to believe that the firm would do anything of 
the sort, however.  We leave the logistics of how ABC Corp. 
might take physical custody of documents to the Appellants, 
the Government, and the District Court if, after considering 
our opinion here, ABC Corp. wishes to test its luck in a 
contempt appeal.  Should it choose that route, the District 
Court will exercise its discretion and determine in the first 
instance the severity of any sanctions it wishes to impose on 
the company.  Although we hold that ABC Corp. must stand 
in contempt before obtaining pre-conviction appellate review, 
we do not mean to suggest that the District Court should 
simply impose a “soft” sanction on the company so that it 
may do so with ease.  As we discuss above, the contempt rule, 
“though at times a harsh one, was formulated to discourage 
appeals in all but the most serious cases.”  In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (Appeal of FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800.5
                                              
5 As Judge Vanaskie points out, even if ABC Corp. chooses 
to proceed with a contempt appeal, Blank Rome and LaCheen 
Wittels would appear, in theory, to be just as much in 
contempt of the District Court’s order as ABC Corp.  We are 
confident, however, that the Government, consistent with its 
representations to our Court, will not seek to hold the law 
firms in contempt if Blank Rome transfers the documents to 
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Next, Appellants posit that even if ABC Corp. could 
take custody of the documents and disobey the District 
Court’s order, Perlman does not require it to do so.  Under 
Appellants’ view of the law, what ABC Corp. may be able to 
do is irrelevant; it is enough in this case that the documents 
are currently in the custody of a disinterested third-party 
(Blank Rome) who has made clear that it will not disobey the 
District Court’s order.  See Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. 
                                                                                                     
ABC Corp. following an agreed procedure.  We are equally 
confident, if not more so, that the District Court will 
appreciate the impropriety of any contempt sanctions against 
the law firms here.  If the Government, ABC Corp., and the 
law firms agree to, and execute, a procedure that results in a 
timely contempt appeal to our Court, the company should 
bear the full risk of that appeal and be the sole target of any 
sanctions, absent any bad faith dealings.  If our confidence is 
misplaced, any contempt sanctions imposed on the law firms 
would be susceptible to reversal as an abuse of the District 
Court’s discretion.  See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 
188 (1958) (“Appellate courts have here a special 
responsibility for determining that the [contempt] power is 
not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising 
themselves the sentences imposed”), overruled on other 
grounds by Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).  It is well-
established that “only ‘[t]he least possible power adequate to 
the end proposed’ should be used in contempt cases.”  United 
States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) (quoting Anderson v. 
Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821)).  Here, the District Court may 
vindicate the defiance of its order and ensure that the decision 
to seek pre-conviction appellate review of its privilege ruling 
is not made lightly by imposing sanctions only on ABC 
Corp., not the law firms. 
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at 18 n.11 (noting in a dictum that “under the so-called 
Perlman doctrine . . . a discovery order directed at a 
disinterested third party is treated as an immediately 
appealable final order because the third party presumably 
lacks a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk contempt by 
refusing compliance”).   
We disagree.  It may be true that the Perlman 
exception also requires the disclosure order to be directed at a 
“disinterested third party.”  But we do not need to decide in 
this appeal whether Blank Rome is a “disinterested third 
party” because the contempt route is open to ABC Corp.6
 Finally, Appellants caution that dismissing for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction in this case would signal the death knell 
  As 
we explain above, whatever else the Perlman exception may 
require, the contempt route must be closed to the objecting 
privilege holder.  That is the very reason the doctrine exists.  
A privilege holder is not “powerless to avert the mischief,” 
Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13, of a disclosure order if it has the 
power to disobey the order and appeal a contempt sanction. 
                                              
6 In a pre-Church of Scientology case, we permitted a 
Perlman appeal when the privilege holder’s former counsel 
held the documents.  In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Appeal 
of FMC Corp.), 604 F.3d at 799–801.  That decision did not 
explicitly discuss, however, a distinction between former and 
current counsel of the privilege holder.  The Tenth Circuit has 
expressly rejected any distinction between former and current 
counsel when determining whether documents are held by a 
“disinterested third party.”  See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2010).  In 
contrast, the Ninth Circuit does recognize a distinction 
between current and former counsel.  See United States v. 
Krane, 625 F.3d 568, 572 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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of Perlman and its 90-plus years of case law.  They say that if 
a Perlman appeal does not lie here, then “privileged 
documents in the client’s possession that are turned over to 
the attorneys as part of their representation to secure legal 
advice could never support a claim of appellate jurisdiction 
under Perlman.”  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 7.  But if the 
District Court’s order applies to the client and the contempt 
route is open to it, that is precisely the law.  As they conceded 
at oral argument, Appellants have not pointed us to a single 
case in which a Court of Appeals has allowed a Perlman 
appeal even though the challenged disclosure order 
commanded the privilege holder itself to disclose the sought-
after documents.  This is hardly surprising because such a 
ruling would undermine the contempt rule first announced in 
Alexander and its 100-plus years of case law.  If this were not 
the law, as the Government correctly points out, “no 
subpoena recipient would ever have to be held in contempt in 
order to appeal an adverse privilege determination. . . .  A 
subpoena recipient could simply give the subpoenaed 
documents to his lawyer and then invoke Perlman.”  
Appellee’s Br. at 19.7
D. 
 
Although not necessary for the disposition of this case, 
we would be remiss not to address the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 
S.Ct. 599 (2009).  The Government argues that, as several of 
our sister Courts of Appeals have suggested, the decision 
Mohawk and its Effect on the Perlman Exception 
                                              
7 We do not mean to suggest that Appellants and their counsel 
transferred to Blank Rome the documents at issue simply to 
create grounds for a Perlman appeal.  Our point is solely one 
about the consequences for future cases of finding jurisdiction 
here. 
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narrows the traditionally understood scope of the Perlman 
exception.  We do not have to decide today the effect of 
Mohawk on the Perlman exception because we hold that 
Perlman — even in its pre-Mohawk form — does not permit 
this appeal.  Nonetheless, the Mohawk Court’s reasoning 
explains why refusing a Perlman appeal in these 
circumstances does not make the District Court’s crime-fraud 
ruling effectively unreviewable. 
The Supreme Court in Mohawk considered “whether 
disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege 
qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine,” and held that they do not.  Id. at 603.  The Court 
did not discuss, mention, or even cite Perlman, which is not 
surprising because the Perlman doctrine and the collateral 
order doctrine recognize separate exceptions to the general 
rules of finality under § 1291.  The collateral order doctrine, 
first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949), provides that there is a “small class” of 
collateral rulings that, although they do not terminate the 
litigation, are appropriately deemed “final” under § 1291.  
Mohawk, 130 S.Ct. at 605 (quoting Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545–
46).  “That small category includes only decisions [1] that are 
conclusive, [2] that resolve important questions separate from 
the merits, and [3] that are effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from the final judgment in the underlying action.”  Swint v. 
Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 45 (1995).  Focusing 
exclusively on the third requirement of the collateral order 
doctrine, the Mohawk Court held that “collateral order 
appeals are not necessary to ensure effective review of orders 
adverse to the attorney-client privilege.”  Mohawk, 130 S.Ct. 
at 606.  
Before reaching its conclusion, the Court first pointed 
out that “[p]ermitting piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . 
undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and encroaches 
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upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a 
‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation.”  Id. at 605 
(quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 
368, 374 (1981)).8
 Doing so, the Court concluded that “postjudgment 
appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and 
assure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege.”  Id. at 606.  
“Appellate courts can remedy the improper disclosure of 
privileged material in the same way they remedy a host of 
other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse 
judgment and remanding for a new trial in which the 
protected material and its fruits are excluded from evidence.”  
Id. at 606–07. 
  Mindful of these costs, the Court did not 
engage in an “individualized jurisdictional inquiry” based on 
the facts of the particular case before it, but instead focused 
on the “entire category” of disclosure orders adverse to the 
attorney-client privilege.  Id. (quotations omitted). 
The Court also surveyed other appellate options 
available to aggrieved privilege holders.  It pointed out that, 
when confronted with an adverse decision from the district 
court, a party in a civil proceeding can ask the district court to 
certify, and the court of appeals to accept, an interlocutory 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1292(b).  Id. at 607.  In 
extraordinary circumstances, it also can petition the court of 
appeals for a writ of mandamus.  Id.  Importantly, the Court 
                                              
8 See also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 
436 (1985) (“Implicit in § 1291 is Congress’ judgment that 
the district judge has the primary responsibility to police the 
prejudgment tactics of litigants, and that the district judge can 
better exercise that responsibility if the appellate courts do not 
repeatedly intervene to second-guess prejudgment rulings.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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reiterated the “long-recognized option . . . for a party to defy a 
disclosure order and incur court-imposed sanctions.”  Id. at 
608. 
Mohawk’s reasoning about the effective reviewability 
of disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege 
may narrow the scope of the Perlman exception.  More 
specifically, we will have to decide whether Mohawk 
prohibits applying the Perlman exception when the person 
asserting privilege is a party in the underlying litigation with 
recourse to other avenues of appellate review, as some other 
Courts of Appeals either have held or suggested. See Holt-
Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that, after Mohawk, “where the privilege holder is a 
party to the litigation with recourse in a post-judgment 
appeal, . . . Perlman no longer affords jurisdiction to hear [an] 
interlocutory appeal”); Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 
(7th Cir. 2010) (noting that “Mohawk Industries calls 
Perlman and its successors into question,” and suggesting 
that, after-Mohawk, the Perlman exception no longer applies 
when the person asserting privilege is a “litigant” in the 
underlying litigation); see also United States v. Krane, 625 
F.3d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding, in a case in which 
“neither the privilege holder nor the custodian of the relevant 
documents [were] parties to the underlying criminal 
proceedings,” that “[t]he Perlman rule survives . . . 
Mohawk”).      
An order requiring the disclosure of privileged 
materials is as effectively reviewable, absent an immediate 
appeal, for subjects of a grand jury investigation as it is for 
parties in civil litigation.  If the grand jury’s investigation 
leads to an indictment and later a conviction, we can remedy 
an “improper disclosure of privileged material . . . by vacating 
the adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial in which 
the protected material and its fruits are excluded from 
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evidence.”  Mohawk, 130 S.Ct. at 606-07.  Of course, a 
subject of a grand jury investigation may never be indicted.  
Appellants are correct that “[e]ven if the subject is charged, 
the charges may be dismissed or the subject may be acquitted 
following trial.  In each of these circumstances, there would 
be no way to vindicate the privilege or protection that has 
been breached.”  Appellants’ Br. at 27.  The Court in 
Mohawk, however, rejected similar arguments in the civil 
litigation context.  After an unfavorable privilege ruling, a 
civil litigant may nonetheless settle, obtain summary 
judgment, or win a favorable verdict, leaving the privilege 
broken and the District Court’s ruling unchallenged.   
The Court’s reasoning in Mohawk underscores how 
denying ABC Corp. a Perlman appeal will still leave the 
company with sufficient (though admittedly not perfect) 
means for making its privilege claims.  However, we leave 
for another day the broader question of whether Mohawk 
forecloses Perlman appeals when the privilege holder is a 
subject or target of an underlying grand jury investigation.   
*    *    *    *    * 
For these reasons, we dismiss for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction.9
 
 
                                              
9 For the sake of judicial economy, we have directed the 
Clerk to assign to this panel any further appeals in this matter. 
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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
In re: Grand Jury, No. 12-1697 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.  
 
I agree with the majority that we lack jurisdiction to 
review the District Court’s order to the extent that it requires 
production directly by ABC Corporation, because the ABC 
Corporation may obtain appellate jurisdiction over that 
portion of the order by standing in contempt.  I write 
separately, however, because I believe that we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Perlman doctrine to review the 
District Court’s order to the extent that it requires production 
by Blank Rome LLP (“Blank Rome”) and LaCheen, Wittels 
& Greenberg, LLP (“LaCheen Wittels”), and therefore 
disagree with the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal in 
its entirety for lack of jurisdiction.  See Perlman v. United 
States, 247 U.S. 7, 15 (1918).  I would instead reach the 
merits and affirm.  
 
I. Jurisdiction 
 
ABC Corporation, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 
(collectively, the “Subjects”) contend that we have 
jurisdiction under the Perlman doctrine because the 
Government subpoenaed the ABC Corporation and two law 
firms representing the Subjects, LaCheen Wittels and Blank 
Rome, for various documents concerning the Subjects.  
Despite the Subjects’ claim of privilege in the documents, the 
District Court ordered production by both ABC Corporation 
and by the law firms.  Because the District Court ordered 
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production in part by the law firms, the Subjects argue that 
the Perlman doctrine confers appellate jurisdiction.  For the 
reasons set forth below, I agree with the majority that the 
Perlman doctrine does not confer jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s order to the extent that it requires production 
directly by ABC Corporation.  I believe that the Subjects are 
correct, however, that we have jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Perlman doctrine to review the order insofar as it requires 
production by the law firms.1
 
 
A. The Perlman Doctrine 
 
As discussed in the majority’s opinion, a witness 
ordered to produce documents before a grand jury may not 
ordinarily bring an interlocutory appeal challenging the order 
requiring production.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1979).  To obtain 
review, the witness must instead stand in contempt and appeal 
the contempt order.  Id.   
 
The Supreme Court, however, carved out an exception, 
known as the Perlman doctrine, permitting privilege holders 
to bring interlocutory appeals of orders requiring production 
by third-party custodians.  See Perlman, 247 U.S. at 15; see 
also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Cianfrani), 563 F.2d 577, 
580 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC 
                                                 
1 I would not hold that we have jurisdiction to consider 
the Subjects’ argument that the District Court abused its 
discretion in declining to state whether a particular individual 
testified before the grand jury.  The Subjects fail to explain 
how this issue bears any relationship whatsoever to the 
Perlman doctrine. 
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Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800; In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 
1076-77 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury, 286 F.3d 153, 157 
(3d Cir. 2002).  In applying the Perlman doctrine, we 
reasoned that a non-subpoenaed privilege holder does not 
have the option of standing in contempt to obtain jurisdiction 
over an order directing production by a third-party custodian, 
because the order is not directed to the privilege holder.  See 
In re Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d 1022, 
1024-25 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d at 1077.  
Moreover, a third-party custodian in possession of 
subpoenaed documents will more likely comply with a 
district court’s order than stand in contempt to protect the 
privilege holder’s rights.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Cianfrani), 563 F.2d at 580.  Because the privilege holder 
cannot stand in contempt or force the third-party custodian to 
stand in contempt, the privilege holder becomes effectively 
“powerless to avert the mischief of the [district court’s] 
order.”  Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13.  To prevent this result, we 
have held that a district court order requiring production by a 
third-party custodian is final as to the privilege holder, and 
permit the privilege holder to take immediate appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See In re Grand Jury (C. Schmidt & 
Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d at 1025 (“[W]hen a party, other than the 
one to whom a subpoena has been addressed, moves to quash 
the subpoena, the denial of his motion disposes of his claim 
fully and finally.”) (citations omitted). 
 
Applying the logic of Perlman to this appeal, I agree 
with the majority that the Subjects cannot appeal the portion 
of the District Court’s order requiring ABC Corporation to 
produce the documents directly.  ABC Corporation is an 
ordinary subpoenaed party, rather than a privilege holder 
challenging production by a third-party, with respect to the 
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portion of the District Court’s order requiring its production.2  
It must therefore stand in contempt to confer jurisdiction over 
this part of the District Court’s order.3
 
  See In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800. 
In my view, however, the portions of the District 
Court’s order requiring production by the law firms directly 
are a different matter.  With respect to the portions 
concerning the law firms, the Subjects are purported privilege 
holders challenging a district court order requiring production 
by third-party custodians.  As in In re Grand Jury (C. Schmidt 
& Sons, Inc.), the Subjects cannot stand in contempt of the 
District Court’s order as to the law firms, because that part of 
                                                 
2 I recognize that John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 also 
appeal the District Court’s order compelling production.  
They raise no argument, however, that they have a right to 
challenge the District Court’s order to the extent that it 
requires production by ABC Corporation, or that their claims 
of privilege are independent of ABC Corporation’s.  See In re 
Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 805 F.2d 120, 
124 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[A]ny privilege that exists as to a 
corporate officer’s role and functions within a corporation 
belongs to the corporation, not the officer.”) (citation 
omitted).  I therefore draw no distinction based on John Doe 
1’s and John Doe 2’s involvement in this appeal. 
 
3 The Subjects argue that the District Court included 
ABC Corporation in its order by mistake and that the District 
Court intended to require production only by the law firms.  I 
agree with the majority, however, that if ABC Corporation 
wishes to make this argument on appeal, it must first stand in 
contempt. 
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the order is not directed to them.  See 619 F.2d at 1024-25.  
The Subjects’ appeal, with respect to the law firms, is thus 
more or less the same as the long line of cases in which we 
have applied the Perlman doctrine.   
 
B. Effect of the Order Against ABC Corporation  
 
The majority distinguishes this appeal principally on 
the grounds that both the law firms and the ABC Corporation 
are subject to the District Court’s order requiring production.  
Therefore, in the majority’s view, ABC Corporation can 
obtain immediate appellate review by demanding that the law 
firms return the documents to it and by sustaining a contempt 
sanction.  The majority’s argument rests, in part, on its 
assertion that if the Subjects can appeal under Perlman, then 
any client will be able to bring an interlocutory appeal by 
giving its documents to its law firm. 
 
I cannot agree with the majority’s logic.  The purpose 
of the Perlman doctrine, as discussed in Section I(A) supra, is 
to enable a privilege holder to appeal an order requiring 
production when he or she “lacks the opportunity to contest 
the subpoena by disobedience because it is not directed to 
him or her.”  In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d at 1077 (quoting In 
re Grand Jury Matter (Dist. Council 33 Health & Welfare 
Fund), 770 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1985)).  That is exactly the 
situation that we now face with respect to the orders 
compelling production of the contested documents by the law 
firms.  Because Blank Rome, rather than ABC Corporation, 
has physical custody over the documents, the Subjects cannot 
unilaterally stand in contempt.  Regardless of ABC 
Corporation’s intent to stand in contempt, Blank Rome can 
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comply with the District Court’s order and produce the 
documents.   
 
I disagree that ABC Corporation has the option of 
obtaining jurisdiction by taking physical custody of the 
documents and refusing to produce them to the Government.  
Although the majority rules out the possibility of the 
Government charging the law firms with obstruction of 
justice, it cannot rule out the possibility that the District Court 
will hold the law firms in contempt.  The Government 
subpoenaed the law firms individually and moved to compel 
them to produce the documents.  The District Court issued an 
order requiring production by the law firms directly.  
Transferring the documents back to ABC Corporation will 
not negate the law firms’ duty to comply with the District 
Court’s order.  See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 
n.9 (1973) (“The rights and obligations of the parties 
bec[o]me fixed when [a] summons [is] served, and [a post-
summons document] transfer [does] not alter them.”) 
(citations omitted); In re Grand Jury Empanelled, 597 F.2d 
851, 865 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that an employer cannot 
defeat a subpoena served on its employee by taking the 
requested documents from the employee and claiming that the 
documents are no longer in the employee’s possession); 
United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(stating that a recipient of a summons cannot defeat the 
summons by relinquishing possession of the requested 
documents); United States v. Three Crows Corp., 324 F. 
Supp. 2d 203, 206 (D. Me. 2004) (“[T]he law does not allow 
a custodian of records to send [the requested documents] 
away after receiving a summons and then claim he cannot 
produce them, because they are no longer in his possession.”).  
Accordingly, if the law firms ignore the District Court’s order 
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and instead turn over the documents to ABC Corporation, 
they will be just as much in contempt as ABC Corporation.4
 
  
See Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 392 (1957) (“[A] 
criminal contempt is committed by one who, in response to a 
subpoena calling for corporation or association records, 
refuses to surrender them when they are in existence and 
within his control.”) (citations omitted); Fed. R. Crim. P. 
17(g) (“The court . . . may hold in contempt a witness who, 
without adequate excuse, disobeys a subpoena issued by a 
federal court in that district.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) 
(authorizing district courts to impose civil contempt sanctions 
when “a witness . . . refuses without just cause shown to 
comply with an order of the court to testify or provide other 
information”). 
I recognize, as the majority highlights, that the 
Government proposed the document transfer, but I disagree 
that we can infer from the Government’s proposal that it will 
forego seeking contempt sanctions against the law firms.  As 
an initial matter, the Government has given us no indication 
that it will ask the District Court to release the law firms from 
                                                 
4 The majority attempts to reduce the likelihood that 
the District Court will hold the law firms in contempt by 
cautioning that our Court will likely view contempt sanctions 
against the law firms under these facts as an abuse of 
discretion.  Regardless of whether we may reverse contempt 
sanctions on appeal, however, we will be forcing the law 
firms to accept the possibility that the District Court will 
impose what may be severe contempt sanctions in the interim.  
As discussed in Section I(A) supra, the purpose of the 
Perlman doctrine is to avoid burdening the custodian with 
that possibility. 
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the order.  Much to the contrary, Blank Rome informed us 
following oral argument that it contacted the Government 
regarding the proposed document transfer, but that the 
Government refused to permit any transfer until receiving our 
ruling.   
 
The Government’s hesitation regarding the document 
transfer is not surprising.  The Government readily admits 
that it subpoenaed the law firms because it had difficulty 
serving ABC Corporation.  If we effectively relinquish the 
law firms from the District Court’s order by allowing them to 
turn over the documents to ABC Corporation without the 
possibility of sanctions, ABC Corporation will presumably 
again argue that it was never properly served.  This argument, 
if successful, will prevent the Government from demanding 
the documents from any party, at least until it properly serves 
ABC Corporation.  Given the significance placed by the 
Government on the order against the law firms, and the 
Government’s apparent refusal to allow a document transfer 
thus far, I disagree that we can assume, without an express 
stipulation, that the Government will permit a document 
transfer without pursuing sanctions against the law firms.5
                                                 
5 During oral argument, the Government proposed that 
ABC Corporation name an employee within the jurisdiction 
to take the documents and for that employee to accept service 
on behalf of ABC Corporation.  Although not explicit from 
the Government’s argument, the Government would 
presumably release the law firms from the possibility of 
sanctions for disobeying the District Court’s order as part of 
this arrangement.  I would have no objection to dismissing for 
lack of jurisdiction if the parties entered into such an 
agreement.  I would likewise have no objection to dismissing 
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The majority emphasizes that the law firms are ABC 
Corporation’s agents, so they have a duty to return the 
documents to ABC Corporation upon ABC Corporation’s 
demand.  Although I agree in general that a client can require 
his or her attorney to return documents, I disagree that ABC 
Corporation can do so in light of the District Court’s order.  A 
client generally cannot require his or her attorney to violate a 
district court order to protect his or her privilege.  An 
attorney, after asserting all non-frivolous objections to 
producing client confidences, may ethically comply with a 
court order requiring production.  See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.6(6) & cmt. 13 (2010); Pa. Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.6 & cmt. 19 (2011); see also In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 
1981) (stating that an attorney may ethically reveal client 
confidences pursuant to a court order).  Because the District 
Court’s order requires the law firms to produce the 
                                                                                                             
if the Government successfully requested that the District 
Court release the law firms from the order.  Neither of these 
events, however, has occurred.  Whether we have jurisdiction 
depends upon the facts existing at the time that we must 
determine jurisdiction.  Because there is no doubt that a 
document transfer will expose the law firms to the possibility 
of contempt sanctions, and the Perlman doctrine provides 
jurisdiction when the custodian is subject to possible 
contempt sanctions, we have jurisdiction.  We cannot avoid 
jurisdiction, and the concomitant responsibility to decide the 
merits of the case, based on the theoretical possibility that the 
parties might reach an agreement that would deprive us of 
jurisdiction. 
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documents, ABC Corporation cannot force the law firms to 
instead return the documents to it. 
 
Moreover, I disagree that applying Perlman when the 
privilege holder is also subject to the District Court’s order 
will enable any client to take a Perlman appeal by turning 
over all documents to his or her attorney.  As the majority 
agrees, the Government may request documents by subpoena 
that are subject to the subpoena recipient’s legal control.  See 
In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1987) (“A 
party’s lack of possession or legal control over documents 
requested by a subpoena is normally a valid defense to a 
subpoena and justification for a motion to quash.”).  As the 
Government appears to agree, a client maintains control over 
documents that he or she turns over to his or her current 
attorney, because the client may ordinarily request the 
documents’ return.  (Appellee’s Br. 16) (“[T]he subjects [of 
the grand jury investigation] do not suggest that the privilege-
holder corporation no longer has the ability to obtain its 
documents from [its lawyer].”); see also Mercy Catholic Med. 
Ctr. v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142, 160 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that control under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) is “the legal right or 
ability to obtain the documents from another source upon 
demand”).  In the majority of future cases, the Government 
will be able to avoid a Perlman appeal by subpoenaing 
records solely from the client-privilege holder and obligating 
the privilege holder to request his or her attorney to produce 
the documents.  A Perlman issue arises in this instance only 
because the Government chose to subpoena the law firms 
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directly, thereby subjecting them to possible contempt 
sanctions should they refuse to comply.6
 
 
Finally, I am concerned that the majority’s rule will 
effectively eviscerate the Perlman doctrine in all instances 
where, as here, the privilege holder can direct the custodian to 
produce the subpoenaed documents, but cannot necessarily 
prevent the custodian from releasing the documents in the 
event a court orders production.  In such cases, the 
Government will have every incentive to subpoena both the 
privilege holder and the custodian, obtain orders against both, 
and use the order against the privilege holder to artificially 
prevent the privilege holder from taking a Perlman appeal.  
Creating such a loophole, in my view, is inconsistent with our 
Court’s interpretation of Perlman as enabling privilege 
holders to obtain jurisdiction when they cannot obtain 
jurisdiction by standing in contempt. 
 
C. Effect of Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter 
 
Next, the Government contends that the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 
Carpenter abrogates Perlman in instances in which the 
                                                 
6 As discussed supra, I appreciate that the Government 
subpoenaed the law firms because it was having difficulty 
subpoenaing ABC Corporation, and that similar situations 
may recur in the future.  Part of the tradeoff to subpoenaing 
law firms directly, however, is the possibility of a Perlman 
appeal.  Additionally, the Government concedes that there is 
no evidence suggesting that the law firms in this case took the 
documents in bad faith.  We therefore do not need to address 
whether to apply Perlman in the event of bad faith conduct. 
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privilege holder is the subject or target of a grand jury 
investigation.  See 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009).  Although the 
majority discusses this argument without relying on it, I 
would reach this argument and hold that Mohawk Industries, 
Inc. does not abrogate Perlman under these facts. 
 
In Mohawk Industries, Inc., the district court 
compelled Mohawk Industries, Inc. (“Mohawk”) to produce 
communications with counsel in a civil suit, finding that 
Mohawk had waived its attorney-client privilege.  Id. at 604.  
Mohawk appealed the order compelling production, asserting 
jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court held that the collateral order doctrine does not 
permit immediate appeal of “disclosure orders adverse to the 
attorney-client privilege.”  Id. at 609.  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that “postjudgment appeals generally suffice to 
protect the rights of litigants and assure the vitality of the 
attorney-client privilege,” because “[a]ppellate courts can 
remedy the improper disclosure of privileged material . . . by 
vacating an adverse judgment and remanding for a new trial 
in which the protected material and its fruits are excluded 
from evidence.”  Id. at 606-07.  
 
Because Mohawk Industries, Inc. does not purport to 
overrule Perlman, it remains binding precedent post-Mohawk 
Industries, Inc. in at least some instances.  Further, as the 
Ninth Circuit explains, “Perlman and Mohawk are not in 
tension,” at least in the context of proceedings in which the 
privilege holder is a non-litigant.  United States v. Krane, 625 
F.3d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 2010).  Mohawk Industries, Inc. holds 
only that civil litigants may not appeal orders adverse to the 
attorney-client privilege, because they can vindicate their 
rights by appealing from the final judgment.  Id.  Non-litigant 
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privilege holders, by contrast, cannot necessarily appeal from 
a final judgment.  See Holt-Orsted v. City of Dickson, 641 
F.3d 230, 238 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that although Mohawk 
Industries, Inc. narrows Perlman when the privilege holder is 
a litigant, non-litigants do not have recourse in a final 
judgment) (citing Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th 
Cir. 2010)).  At a minimum, Perlman thus continues to afford 
jurisdiction in appeals by non-litigants. 
 
Grand jury subjects, such as the privilege holders in 
this case, are non-litigants.  See Cobbledick v. United States, 
309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (“[A] grand jury proceeding has no 
defined litigants . . . .”); In re Witness before Special Oct. 
1981 Grand Jury, 722 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(“[T]here are no parties to a grand jury investigation . . . .”).  
Although the Government argues that grand jury subjects are 
equivalent to litigants because they can appeal a final decision 
if they are convicted, the grand jury need not return an 
indictment.  We therefore have no guarantee that grand jury 
subjects will ever have the opportunity to appeal a final 
decision.   
 
I understand the majority’s point that an order 
requiring production is not necessarily any more reviewable 
in the civil context than in the grand jury context, because the 
parties in civil litigation may settle or receive a favorable 
decision that does not address the privilege claims.  The 
parties in civil litigation, however, have at least some degree 
of control in shaping the litigation and can, in many instances, 
decide whether or not to leave their privileges broken.  For 
example, a privilege holder in a civil suit can decide whether 
or not to settle.  Grand jury subjects, unless later charged, 
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have no equivalent control over the proceedings and no final 
judgment from which to appeal.  
 
Furthermore, Perlman expressly provides that a 
privilege holder in the grand jury context need not wait to 
“seek a remedy at some other time and in some other way.”  
247 U.S. at 13.  The privilege holder can instead challenge 
the order immediately.  Id.  Applying the logic of Mohawk 
Industries, Inc. to a grand jury proceeding and holding that 
grand jury subjects must wait to appeal a final decision is thus 
the equivalent of holding that Mohawk Industries, Inc. 
abrogates Perlman entirely.  Absent a Supreme Court 
decision explicitly overruling Perlman, I do not believe that 
we should assume that Perlman is no longer binding 
precedent.   
 
D. Effect of Current Representation by the Law Firms 
 
Finally, although not addressed by the majority, the 
Government argues that the Perlman doctrine does not apply 
in this instance because the law firms are not “[d]isinterested 
[t]hird [p]arties” due to their current representation of the 
Subjects.  (Appellee’s Br. 15.)  I believe that the Perlman 
doctrine applies to current attorneys and would reject this 
argument. 
 
As an initial matter, our Court’s interpretation of the 
Perlman doctrine does not require strict disinterest, at least in 
the sense of requiring total non-affiliation with the privilege 
holder.7
                                                 
7 The description of the Perlman doctrine as applying 
to “disinterested third parties” stems from dicta in Church of 
  We have instead tended to focus our analysis on 
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whether the privilege holder “is in a position to control the 
[subpoenaed custodian’s] decision whether to produce the 
records,” and on whether the third-party’s personal stake in 
the matter is substantial enough for it to likely stand in 
contempt to protect the privilege holder’s rights.  In re Grand 
Jury Matter, 802 F.2d at 99; see In re Grand Jury (C. Schmidt 
& Sons, Inc.), 619 F.2d at 1024-25 (holding that the privilege 
holder’s employees are third-parties under Perlman because 
employees are unlikely to stand in contempt to protect their 
employer).  Applying this framework, we have already held 
that a privilege holder’s former attorney qualifies as a third-
party custodian under the Perlman doctrine, reasoning that a 
former attorney is not guaranteed to stand in contempt to 
protect his or her former client’s privilege.  See In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d at 800-01.   
 
I believe, as do the majority of other circuits that have 
addressed this issue, that there is no reason to apply a 
different rule to current attorneys.8
                                                                                                             
Scientology v. United States that our Court has not adopted.  
506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992).  
  See, e.g., In re Grand 
  
8 A small number of circuits do not hold that current 
attorneys are categorically third-party custodians under 
Perlman, instead applying Perlman “when circumstances 
make it unlikely that an attorney would risk a contempt 
citation in order to allow immediate review of a claim of 
privilege.”  In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 
1985); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 
1180 n.11 (10th Cir. 2010) (“A court may, but is not required 
to, draw an inference that a current attorney is more likely to 
risk contempt in order to protect a client’s privilege than a 
former attorney or a third party.”).  I would reach the same 
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Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 699 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[W]e 
adopt the majority rule and apply the Perlman exception to 
those cases wherein a client seeks immediate appeal of an 
order compelling production of a client’s records from his 
attorney.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 
641 F.2d at 203 (holding that current attorneys qualify as 
third-parties under Perlman); In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Gordon), 722 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983) (“This Court . . . 
joins the majority of other Circuits in applying the Perlman 
exception in those cases wherein a client seeks immediate 
appeal of an order compelling testimony from his attorney.”); 
In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying the 
Perlman doctrine to current attorneys); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 655 F.2d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he 
Perlman exception is available to a client-intervenor when he 
is appealing an order compelling testimony or documents 
from his attorney.”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 
1351, 1352 n.1 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that the Eleventh 
Circuit is bound by the Fifth Circuit’s rule holding that 
attorneys are third-parties under Perlman).  While a client’s 
interests may be more closely aligned with his or her current 
attorney than with a former attorney, a client cannot control 
whether his or her attorney chooses to stand in contempt.  As 
discussed in Section I(B) supra, after asserting all non-
frivolous arguments against disclosing a client’s privileged 
information, attorneys are generally permitted to comply with 
a district court order compelling production.  See Model 
Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(6) & cmt. 13 (2010). 
 
                                                                                                             
result under this rule as under the categorical approach, 
because Blank Rome has already indicated that it will not 
stand in contempt. 
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Moreover, to the extent that current attorneys are 
“interested parties,” they, like former attorneys, are unlikely 
to be so interested that they will stand in contempt to protect 
their client’s privilege.  See In re Grand Jury Proceedings in 
Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d at 203 (“we can say without 
reservation that some significant number of client-intervenors 
might find themselves denied all meaningful appeal by 
attorneys unwilling to” stand in contempt on their client’s 
behalf).  Accordingly, because an attorney need not, and 
probably will not, stand in contempt to protect his or her 
client’s privilege, I believe that our Court’s longstanding 
interpretation of the Perlman doctrine requires finding that 
current attorneys are third-parties. 
 
Additionally, requiring attorneys to stand in contempt 
to enable their clients to appeal unnecessarily fosters conflicts 
of interest between attorneys and their clients.  As the First 
Circuit explained in overruling its prior decision excluding 
attorneys from the Perlman doctrine, requiring attorneys to 
stand in contempt “pits lawyers against their clients” by 
requiring attorneys to choose between protecting their clients’ 
interests and protecting themselves against potentially serious 
contempt sanctions.  In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d at 
699 (citing United States v. Edgar, 82 F.3d 499, 507-08 (1st 
Cir. 1996)).  I share the First Circuit’s view that placing 
attorneys in this predicament “hinders the fair representation 
of the client.”  Id. 
 
I am aware that the Ninth Circuit does not ordinarily 
permit Perlman appeals when the custodian is the privilege 
holder’s current attorney.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 825 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to 
apply the Perlman doctrine when the custodian is the 
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privilege holder’s current attorney).  I cannot agree, however, 
with the Ninth Circuit’s logic.  The Ninth Circuit implies that 
a current attorney is more likely to stand in contempt than a 
former attorney, because a current attorney “is both subject to 
the control of the person or entity asserting the privilege and 
is a participant in the relationship out of which the privilege 
emerges.”  Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served 
upon Niren, 784 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1986)).  This 
reasoning disregards the fact that a privilege holder’s control 
over his or her attorney does not extend to deciding whether 
his or her attorney stands in contempt.  Because the 
custodian’s likelihood of standing in contempt is the relevant 
type of control under the Perlman doctrine, I do not find the 
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning to be persuasive and would hold 
that we have jurisdiction.   
 
II. Merits 
 
 Instead of dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, I would 
affirm the District Court’s decision on the merits.  The 
Subjects raise a plethora of legal arguments challenging the 
District Court’s order compelling production, none of which 
has any merit.  The Subjects’ chief contention is that the 
District Court erred in finding that the crime-fraud exception 
vitiates their purported attorney-client and work-product 
privileges because, in their view, the District Court applied 
“an improper standard” for determining whether the crime-
fraud exception applies.  (Appellants’ Br. 45.)  I do not agree 
that the District Court committed any such error. 
 
 The crime-fraud exception overrides the attorney-
client and work-product privileges “only when the legal 
advice ‘gives direction for the commission of [a] future fraud 
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or crime.’”  In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 223 F.3d 213, 217 
(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 975 F.2d 
81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992)).  The Government may invoke the 
crime-fraud exception by “mak[ing] a prima facie showing 
that (1) the client was committing or intending to commit a 
fraud or crime, . . .  and (2) the attorney-client 
communications were in furtherance of that alleged crime or 
fraud.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The Government satisfies its 
prima facie showing by “present[ing] . . . ‘evidence which, if 
believed by the fact-finder, would be sufficient to support a 
finding that the elements of the crime-fraud exception were 
met.’”  Id. (quoting Haines, 975 F.2d at 95-96). 
 
 The Subjects argue that, in deciding whether the 
Government satisfied its prima facie case, the District Court 
improperly relied on what they assert was dicta from our 
decision in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 275 
(3d Cir. 2006), instead of requiring the Government to present 
evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the elements of 
the crime-fraud exception were met.”  In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena, 223 F.3d at 217 (quoting Haines, 975 F.2d at 90).  
Specifically, the Subjects contend that the District Court 
improperly lowered the standard for the Government’s prima 
facie case by requiring evidence “demonstrating [only] a 
reasonable basis to suspect the perpetration of a crime.”  (S.A. 
31) (quoting In re Grand Jury Investigation, 445 F.3d at 275). 
 
 The District Court included both prongs of the prima 
facie case and the “sufficient to support a finding” standard in 
its opinion.  (S.A. 16.)  It then thoroughly reviewed the 
record, including the submissions from both the Government 
and from the Subjects, to ascertain whether the Government 
showed adequate evidence of a crime or fraud.  Thus, 
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regardless of whether the District Court should not have used 
the “reasonable basis to suspect” language, its comprehensive 
review of the record demonstrates that it applied a standard as 
high as, if not higher than, the “sufficient to support” 
standard.  Accordingly, I would reject the Subjects’ argument 
concerning whether the District Court applied the correct 
standard for assessing the crime-fraud exception.  As for the 
Subjects’ remaining arguments, I would affirm for 
substantially the reasons given by the District Court in its 
thoughtful opinion. 
